This article argues that new venture formation is a speciai case of strategic management theory. Thus, Sandberg & Hofer's (1987) model of new venture performance, which states that new venture performance is a function of industry structure, venture strategy, and the founding entrepreneur, must be extended to Inciude the resources and the organizational structure, processes, and systems developed by the venture to implement its strategy and achieve its objectives. The key assumptions underlying this model are presented, and specific propositions concerning how resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems affect new venture performance are developed.
any form because, first, venturing is a special case of strategic management theory and, second, the model is derived from the dominant paradigm of that field. At the same time, given that venturing is a special case and there are different types of ventures, we do not make the same claim of generality with respect to the propositions to be derived in the article.
There are many methods by which the performance of a venture might be measured (Dollinger, 1984) , and it is beyond the scope of this article to debate the relative merits of these approaches. Rather, we shall discuss venture performance along two dimensions: survival and success. The first, survival, is the opposite of failure. A venture fails when it ceases to exist as an economic entity. Failure may occur because a venture is unable to satisfy its financial obligations to creditors or because it is unable to meet the objectives of its owners. Put differently, survival is an absolute measure of venture performance that depends on the ability of the venture to continue to operate as a self-sustaining economic entity (Barney, 1986a) . Success, by contrast, is a relative measure of venture performance that occurs when the venture creates value for its customers in a sustainable and economically efficient manner (Barney, 1991; Coyne, 1986; Schumpeter, 1934) . Although it may take several years for a new venture to earn a profit (Biggadike, 1979; Weiss, 1981) , its ability to create lasting, hard-to-imitate value, suggests that if it survives those initial years, superior levels of profitability and growth vis-a-vis its competitors should occur. We take this two-dimensional view of new venture performance because a central assumption of the theoretical model presented in this article is that the determinants of a venture's survival are somewhat different from the determinants of its success. For example, while strategy is considered a primary cause of business success (Hofer & Schendel, 1978) , it is rarely featured prominently as a cause of business failure (Cochran, 1981; Dickinson, 1981) .
Venturing and Strategic Management Theory
The initiation of a new business venture is predicated upon the decisions of its founders concerning customers, products or services, resources, technologies, and methods of organization (Cooper, 1979; Gartner, 1985; Katz & Gartner, 1988) . In the field of strategic management such decisions are called "strategic" because each has a significant impact on the performance of the business making them. For example, strategic management theory suggests that a business unit's performance is both directly and indirectly related to the environment of the industry in which it competes, the resources it controls, the strategy it uses to align available resources with environmental opportunity, and the organizational structure, processes, and systems it employs to implement its chosen strategy (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980 Porter, , 1985 White & Hamermesh, 1981) . Theorists also agree that top management is responsible for making strategic decisions, and, therefore, is responsible for the performance of a business (Andrews, 1971; Schendel & Hofer, 1979) .
Such decisions are also important to a new venture, although the nature of the decisions and the problems it confronts are different from those facing an established business owing to differences in history, age, size, attitudes toward change, and so on (Cooper, 1979; Stinchcombe, 1965) . In fact, as the research models used in the studies of new venture performance shown in Table 1 suggest, the determinants of performance of a new venture and an established business are nearly identical.
Based on this evidence, we conclude that the performance of new ventures and established businesses depends upon a set of factors that vary more in importance and form than type. As a consequence, any theory of new venture performance should be treated as a special case of strategic management theory (Sandberg, 1986; Schendel & Hofer, 1979) and include consideration of the entrepreneur (E), industry structure (IS), Sapienza & Herron, 1990 Sexton & Van Auken, 1985 Smallbone, 1990 Small, Gannon, Grimm, & Mitchell, 1988 Stuart & Abetti, 1987 Stuart & Abetti, 1990 Van de Ven, Hudson, & Schroeder, 1984 Venkataraman, Van de Ven, Buckeye & Hudson, 1990 Westhead, 1990 business strategy (BS), resources (R), and organizational structure, processes, and systems (OS), as shown in the functional relationship depicted below.
New Venture Performance = f(E, IS, BS, R, OS) (2) Implicit Assumptions of the Sandberg & Hofer Model Sandberg and Hofer (1987) also considered venturing as a special case of strategic management theory, yet did not include resources or organizational structure, processes, and systems variables in their model. By excluding variables representing these determinants of performance, they made two implicit assumptions that require examination.
1. Resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems have, at best, a marginal direct affect on new venture performance. 2. The venture possesses, or can develop, the resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems necessary to implement its intended strategy.
While not included in their model, Sandberg and Hofer (1987) recognize the importance of resources, pointing out that any strategy intended to be non-imitative is indicative of some desired distinctive competence. Nevertheless, an intended strategy is not always realized (Mintzberg, 1978) , and a strategy, whether realized or not, may not always fulfill organizational objectives. A desired distinctive competence may not materialize, and there is no guarantee that the venture's structure wiU be conducive to the implementation of its chosen strategy (Chandler, 1962; Hofer & Charan, 1984) . Furthermore, the lack of other key resources such as distribution channels and image may offset advantages of distinctive competence (Sandberg, 1986 ).
Sandberg and Hofer may have excluded resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems variables from the model because the availability of financial resources and professional managers are not of critical concern in venture capital-backed ventures, and because the oversight of the venture capitalist investors may compensate for a lack of formal control systems. Nevertheless, inadequate financial resources, management teams, and control systems are known to be prominent causes of failure among ventures without such backing and support (Hofer & Charan, 1984; Schendel & Hofer, 1979) .
Likewise, these variables may have been excluded from the model because the entrepreneur exerts such a profound influence on the venture. It is conceptually useful to consider the venture's resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems as separate constructs, however, because the entrepreneur, no matter how influential, is not the organization or its only resource (Gartner, 1985; Katz & Gartner, 1988) .
The above discussion suggests that both resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems variables are directly related to new venture performance and may not be reflected in a venture's strategy. As a consequence, both of the assumptions that might support the exclusion of these variables from the model are of questionable validity for ventures not backed by venture capitalists. In fact, Sandberg (1986) and Sandberg and Hofer (1987) questioned whether the model would apply to other types of ventures.
EXTENDING THE MODEL OF NEW VENTURE PEREORMANCE: THE EIRST STEPS
Having established the necessity of incorporating resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems variables in models of new venture performance, we now turn our attention to an extended discussion of the elements included in the model proposed by Sandberg and Hofer (1987) . Some of the critical variables affecting new venture performance with respect to the entrepreneur, industry structure, and strategy are displayed in Tables 2-4, respectively. Although we shall attempt to extend the theoretical foundations of the existing model, this section will also attempt to draw attention to the relationships between the elements of Sandberg and Hofer's model and the two elements that were excluded from their model.
The Entrepreneur
A long and continuing tradition argues that the entrepreneur is important to the venture's creation and performance (Baumol, 1968; Carland, Hoy, & Carland, 1988; McClelland, 1961; Schumpeter, 1934) . However, in spite of the numerous attempts to establish empirically the importance of an entrepreneur's personality, the evidence has been inconclusive (e.g., Brockhaus, 1980a) .
More recently, however, theorists have suggested that greater progress might be possible if the focus of research is shifted to the types and quality of the entrepreneur's behaviors and decisions (Carsrud & Johnson, 1989; Gartner, 1988; . This is because the determination of the type of venture that is started, the strategies used to enter the chosen industry and compete within it, the attempt to identify and secure necessary resources, and the development of an organization able to effectively implement the chosen strategy, emanate from the behaviors and decisions of the entrepreneur(s).
Furthermore, other theorists have suggested that these behaviors and decisions will be a function of the entrepreneur's skills, experience, and values (Buchele, 1967; Scherer, Adams, & Wiebe, 1989; Susbauer, 1979) . Over the last few years, research on the skills of the entrepreneur (Herron, 1990) , the experience of the entrepreneur (Van de Ven, Hudson, & Schroeder, 1984) , and the experience of the venture team (Roure & Maidique, 1986) has provided support for these viewpoints (see Table 2 ). Thus:
El: The survival and success of a new venture will be a function of the behaviors and decisions of the entrepreneur. E2: The entrepreneur's personality, skills, experience, and values affect the entrepreneur's behaviors and decisions.
Consistent with the second proposition, researchers have suggested that the entrepreneur's skills and previous experience will influence both its ability to obtain resources (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Sandberg, 1986) , and the decision regarding the industry in which the venture will enter (Cooper & Bruno, 1977; Eeeser & Willard, 1989 . E2a: The resources assembled by a new venture are influenced by the skills and experience of the entrepreneur. E2b: The industry which the venture enters, and hence industry structure, is influenced by the skills and experience of the entrepreneur.
Similarly, the experience and skills, along with the personality and values, of the entrepreneur have been linked with decisions regarding the strategy (Andrews, 1971; Eisenhardt, 1989; Herron, 1990; Vesper, 1980) , and organizational structure, processes, and systems of a venture (Bouwen & Steyaert, 1990; Hofer & Charan, 1984) .
E2c: The entrepreneur's skills, experience, personality, and values will affect the formulation of the venture's business strategy. E2d: The entrepreneur's skills, experience, personality, and values will affect the configuration of the venture's organizational structure, processes, and systems.
Industry Structure
The first strategic decision confronting the entrepreneur is which opportunity to pursue, or in other words, the corporate strategy decision of, "What business(es) should we be in?" (Hofer & Schendel, 1978, p. 27) . This is arguably the most important strategic decision because the structure of the industry (e.g., stage of industry evolution, barriers to entry and mobility, nature of rivalry, power of buyers and suppliers, nature of buyer needs, degree of industry heterogeneity, as shown in Table 3 ) providing the opportunity will infiuence both the probability of venture success and the likelihood that a new entrant will survive long enough to be successful (Porter, 1979 (Porter, , 1980 . However, as noted above, this decision is not context-free since the experience and skills of the entrepreneur will, or should, largely determine the industry a venture enters.
Industry structure has both an absolute and a relative affect on new venture performance. The attractiveness of the industry with respect to business opportunities affects the absolute or average profit potential of the industry, and, therefore, the expected returns of a venture (Porter, 1979 (Porter, , 1980 . First of all, structural barriers and gateways to the industry have a profound impact on whether a new venture will be able to enter it at all (Kunkel & Hofer, 1991; Porter, 1980; Yip, 1982) . Second, the level of resources necessary for survival, the possibility of retaliation by incumbents, and the growth in demand relative to supply will directly infiuence the ability of the venture to remain in business during its formative years when it is most vulnerable to competitive shocks (Hannan & Ereeman, 1984; Kunkel & Hofer, 1991; Stinchcombe, 1965) . Third, the munificence of the industry environment will determine the amount of resources available to the venture since capital typically fiows to those industries where opportunities are abundant (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Ulrich & Barney, 1984) . And in turn, the resources a venture is able to secure will affect its probability of survival.
ISl: Industry structure has both a direct and moderating effect on new venture survival.
The structure of the industry that a venture enters also has a moderating effect on its relative performance, and, hence, its ability to achieve success. This is so because while the structure of the industry may provide opportunities, such as when industry heterogeneity results in an unfilled market niche, opportunities by themselves are a necessary but not sufficient condition for venture success. The venture must also possess or be able to acquire rare, hard-to-duplicate resources (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989) , and must formulate a strategy to align those resources with opportunity in a manner that creates value (Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978 
Business Strategy
While corporate strategy broadly specifies the industry where opportunities are pursued, business strategy specifies the particulars of opportunity in terms of products, customers, and technologies (Abell, 1980) and how resources are deployed (Chrisman, Hofer, & Boulton, 1988) . In other words, business strategy deals with the way a firm competes in a given industry (Hofer & Schendel, 1978) . Table 4 provides a list of business strategy variables found to be related to new venture performance. The strategy of a new venture, however, is unique, a special case with its own peculiar characteristics. Unlike an established business, a new venture has little history and no "realized" strategy from which to build (Cooper, 1979; Mintzberg, 1978) . In its early stages, the new venture's intended strategy must be designed to surmount rather than build or exploit barriers inhibiting entry into an industry if it is to survive (Bain, 1956; Caves & Porter, 1977; Hatten & Hatten, 1987; Porter, 1980 (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990) because the only resources available are those the entrepreneur possesses or can muster from capitalists willing to accept the risk of organization (Schumpeter, 1934) .
This, of course, must be accompanied by a clear strategy for developing and deploying the resources the venture controls, or seeks to control, if the venture is to attain a lasting competitive advantage in its targeted market (Coyne, 1986; Hofer, 1975; Ohmae, 1982) . Without such a strategy there is little hope that the venture will be able to achieve the growth and profit potential inherent in its industry (Porter, 1980 (Porter, , 1985 . However, while competitive advantage and success may be sought, survival, which depends upon available resources, remains a paramount strategic concern.
SI; A venture's strategy has a direct and moderating effect on its survival and success. SI a: A venture's strategy to obtain resources from the environment has a direct effect on its survival and a moderating effect on its success. Sib; A venture's strategy for the development and deployment of the resources it controls directly effects its success and survival; the effect of strategy on the former is greater than the effect on the latter. S2: In its early stages of evolution, a venture's strategy to obtain resources is just as important as its strategy to deploy resources.
Kazanjian's (1988) study of high-technology ventures indicates that as a venture grows and develops, strategy continues to be critically important. His findings also suggest, however, that across stages of growth, the strategic problem is more important in the first and last stages than it is in a venture's intermediate stages. Whereas strategy in early stages of growth is equally concerned with problems of securing and deploying resources, in later stages of growth the problem shifts to the manner in which those resources should be redeployed to maintain the momentum of the venture's early years (Hofer & Charan, 1984) . Thus, as the venture approaches maturity and, hence, becomes more like an established business, the utilization or redeployment of its stock of resources becomes relatively more important for sustaining competitive advantage than securing flows of new resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) , although such resource flows continue to be vital to replenish critical stocks and replace stocks that are no longer of significant value. S3; As the venture approaches maturity, its strategy to develop and deploy the resources it controls becomes more critical, and its strategy to obtain additional resources from the environment becomes less critical, than in its earlier stages of growth.
FURTHER EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL OF NEW VENTURE PERFORMANCE
As stated earlier, resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems are integral parts of strategic management theory (Hofer & Schendel, 1978) , and new ventures are organizations which represent a special case of that theory. Furthermore, the evidence provided in Table 1 shows that a large proportion of the recent studies in the field of entrepreneurship includes variables representing one or both of these elements in their research models. Therefore, solid theoretical and practical grounds exist for con 15 eluding that both sets of variables belong in any model of new venture performance. The remainder of this section explores these previously excluded elements of the extended model of new venture performance.
Resources
As shown in Table 5 , resources include the tangible and intangible assets an orga- (Barney, 1986b (Barney, , 1991 Caves, 1980; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Hall, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984) . Up to this point, we have not attempted to distinguish between tangible and intangible assets. However, it now becomes necessary to do so because there are important differences in the manner in which these two types of resources affect the probalDility of a venture's survival and success. Tangible assets are, in general, those resources for which there are well-defined markets and, therefore, can be priced in concordance with their value. The tangible assets a company controls are typically included on its balance sheet. By contrast, intangible assets lack well-defined markets, making them more difficult to price in a manner reflecting their true value (Barney, 1986b) . It is important to note that some tangible resources, such as labor and land, also possess intangible qualities. For example, land has value that can be priced through market mechanisms. At the same time, because land is fixed in space, its location may have additional value that is more difficult to establish because of its dependence upon the use and user. A location giving a venture easy access to raw materials, suppliers, customers, labor, or support services is more valuable than a location that does not (Cooper, 1979) . Therefore, the price of the land may not fully reflect the value of the location for a venture using it.
The tangible and intangible assets any new venture possesses or can control is a primary determinant of its strategy (Andrews, 1971; Carroll, 1984) , and thus, moderates the effect of strategy on performance (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Barney, 1991; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Quinn, 1985) . Insufficient or inaccessible resources may severely limit the range of feasible strategic alternatives available and put the independent venture at a further disadvantage to relatively better endowed and entrenched competitors. Resource inadequacy, for example, may force a new venture to forgo a strategy predicated on economies of scope (Carroll, 1984) , even though such a strategy may be necessary to obtain a competitive advantage in the earlier stages of an industry's evolution (Brittain & Freeman, 1980; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Romanelli, 1989; .
Put differently, the performance of a venture in a given industry depends upon more than just a good idea. It is one thing to formulate a broad scope, low-cost strategy based on a new technological process; it is quite another to secure the resources and build the competence necessary to implement such a strategy. Even a venture with a carefully designed strategy cannot survive if it lacks capital. Likewise, achieving success will be almost impossible if the venture lacks people with the requisite skills or commitment to make the strategy a reality.
In general, the survival of a venture will depend upon its ability to secure tangible resources such as capital, credit, land, facilities, and labor with which to do business; few ventures can survive for long without these resources. The probability of the short-term survival of a venture with adequate tangible resources should be high because small mistakes and initial losses can be absorbed more readily (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; Katz & Gartner, 1988; Schumpeter, 1934; Venkatraman, Van de Ven, Buckeye, & Hudson, 1990; Weiss, 1981) . Nevertheless, having even more of these resources does not necessarily increase the probability of superior performance (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985; Stevenson, Roberts, & Grousback, i989) . in fact, while a venture's chances for survival appears to be positively related to its initial size, an indirect measure of its tangible assets, the research of Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1989) suggests that such resources are not necessarily related to a venture's successful growth. This is because tangible resources, being relatively plentiful, simple to understand, and easy to trade, imitate, or substitute for, usually do not provide a basis for creating a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, i991). These assets will not typically generate abovenormal levels of profits because their prices will more fully refiect their long-term value (Barney, 1986b (Barney, , 1991 . RI: The level of a venture's tangible resources will have a positive effect on its probability of survival but not necessarily its probability of achieving success.
By contrast, the success of a venture will depend more upon its ability to obtain or develop intangible assets such as networks (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991) , favorable location (Cooper, 1979) , functional skills and know-how, patents, and reputation (Hall, 1992) . Intangible assets are more complex, less likely to be imitated, and more difficult to substitute for or obtain through internal trade or development; and the reasons for their value are more ambigious. Thus, they are more likely to possess the properties necessary for sustained competitive advantage than tangible assets (Barney, 1991; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990) .
The most important intangible asset a venture can possess is distinctive competence, or what it does uncommonly well (Andrews, 1971) . A distinctive competence possesses all the characteristics necessary for obtaining a sustainable competitive advantage that can lead to success because, representing a confluence of technical and managerial resources (McKelvey, 1982) , it is especially difficult to duplicate (Grant, 1991) . As noted above, a strategy intended to create competitive advantage depends on the availability of intangible assets with distinctive properties and value; and, in turn, a distinctive competence depends on a strategy to obtain and align the assets necessary for its development.
R2: A venture's level of intangible resources has a positive direct and moderating effect on its success.
While strategy continues to matter as a venture matures, the value of its intangible resources increases in its own right. In fact, when considered in the context of industry structure, distinctive competence, once developed, has been shown to affect the performance of a mature business irrespective of its strategy (Chrisman & Boulton, 1987; Sousa & Hambrick, 1989) . This is partially because a strategy, whether intended or not, has emerged and become realized (Mintzberg, 1978) . While an outmoded strategy may eventually erode competitive performance, because resource advantages are no longer maximized, the presence of a stock of distinctive intangible resources continues to be important to venture success (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) . R3: As a venture approaches maturity, the direct effect of intangible resources becomes more important to its success.
Organizational Structure, Processes, and Systems
An organization's structure, processes, and systems, the primary means by which it implements its strategy, involve selecting and building a structure to divide work; coordinating and integrating functions; facilitating flows of information; managing the processes of recruitment, training, and succession; and, motivating, measuring, and controlling behaviors of organizational members (Andrews, 1971; Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986 ). Research has indicated that the organizational structure, processes, and systems of a new venture are associated with its performance Covin & Slevin, 1989; Duchesneau & Gartner, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Miller, 1983; . Table 6 lists organizational structure, processes, and systems variables that research and theory suggest are related to new venture performance.
A central tenet of strategic management theory is that an organization's performance depends on the congruence of its strategy and structure, processes, and systems (Chandler, 1962) . Powell (1992) has even suggested that organizational alignment skills can be viewed as strategic resources, capable of producing above-normal profits. No matter how implementation variahles are viewed, though, the congruence of structure, processes, and systems with strategy is especially important for a new venture hecause hoth influence the development of its distinctive competence (Selznick, 1957) . As Scott (1971) notes, however, in its early stages of development a new venture is usually a "one-man" show with little or no formal structure, functional differentiation, or clear pattern of productservice transactions. Furthermore, a new venture rarely has objective or systematic methods to measure individual or sub-unit performance and bestow rewards; and its control systems will be rudimentary, at best. The absence of fixed structure and functional specialization may be unavoidable since decision-making power is largely vested in the hands of the entrepreneur(s). Nevertheless, it also appears that the structural flexibility inherent in a new venture may be necessary for fostering the development of distinctive competence, because it may not be entirely clear at the time of creation what sort of structure, processes, and systems will be needed to support its strategy as it matures (McKinney & McKinney, 1989) . Put differently, the lack of structural formality of a venture in its early stages of growth may facilitate its ability to develop structure, processes, and systems that are in accord with the strategy that is eventually realized (Mintzberg, 1978) .
Thus, a venture's initial structure gives rise to an emergent culture that may either promote or constrain future growth (Bouwen & Steyaert, 1990; Kilman, Saxton, Serpa, & Associates, 1985) . Barney (1986a) has suggested that one of the few periods in which it might be possible for an organization to develop a culture providing sustainable competitive advantage is in its early stages of growth. This is because the characteristic flexibility of a venture may foster a culture that is both imperfectly imitable and uniquely suited to the strategic deployment of resources that are necessary to achieve success.
On the other hand, the structural attributes that increase the probability of a venture's success may decrease its probability of survival. The entrepreneurial processes of a new venture are at odds with the processes necessary to ensure fixed structural responses (Dosi, 1988; Kanter, 1988) . In the words of population ecologists (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) , the structure of the new venture is not reproducible because it does not include highly standardized organizational routines, nor has it been institutionalized. While the cost of standard routines and a formal structure is organizational rigidity, the benefits are reliability and accountability, both of which favor a venture's survival prospects in a turbulent environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1977 Selznick, 1957; Stinchcombe, 1965) . As Katz and Gartner (1988, p. 436) note, a new venture is unique in that both its ability to adapt and its vulnerability to environmental selection pressures are high.
OSl: In a venture's early stages of growth, flexibility of organizational structure, processes, and systems has a negative effect on its probability of survival, but a positive effect on its probability of success.
Despite its importance in the early stages of a venture's growth, this lack of formal organization must be overcome at some point if the venture is to develop into a substantial, mature enterprise (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985) . Research has suggested that as it approaches maturity, a venture's performance is positively related to decreased centralization and increased formalization and functional specialization (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990) . In other words, the initial flexibility of a new venture's structure, processes, and systems should promote the discovery of a pattern of organizational alignment that best suits its particular strategic needs. However, once that pattern is found it is essential that any advantage it endows becomes institutionalized through standard routines and reporting relationships. 0S2: As a venture approaches maturity, formality of structure, processes, and systems increases the probability of survival and success.
Thus, the venture's needs with respect to its structure, processes, and systems vary depending on its stage of growth. However, an organization cannot be transformed overnight, or simply by fiat; it must go through a process of transition that carries with it unique pitfalls as well as potential benefits.
Various authors have noted the crises of transition that characterize the development of a venture as it attempts to realign its organizational structure, processes, and systems to meet a new set of needs and challenges (Greiner, 1972; Hofer & Charan, 1984; Scott, 1971) . A revised structure cannot ensure a venture's success, though; that depends upon how well its strategy and distinctive competence are aligned with its environment. On the other hand, Hofer and Charan (1984) suggest that after start-up problems have been solved, problems in the transition from one stage of growth to another are the most likely causes of venture failure. With a structure ill-suited for its strategy, the venture may get caught in the middle, unwilling to revert to its old strategy or rate of growth, yet unable to make the transition to a new structural arrangement.
0S3: A venture's organizational structure, processes, and systems are most important to its survival during periods in which it must make the transition from one stage of growth to another.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have argued that the formation of new ventures is a special case of strategic management theory, and, as a consequence, any model of new venture performance should recognize the critical nature of resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems. Such extension is consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature, and should apply to all types of new ventures, whether initiated by individuals acting independently in their own self-interest or by one or more established corporations. The extension of theory presented in this article suggested an intimate relationship between the five factors that determine the performance of new ventures. First, it is important to note that new venture performance will be primarily a function of the critical decisions and behaviors of entrepreneurs in recognizing environmental opportunity, assembling resources needed to pursue opportunity, developing a strategy to align resources to exploit opportunity, and designing an organization capable of putting the strategy into action. Second, the development of independent ventures begins with a decision about the nature of the business, a decision that involves a choice among industries. Regardless of the type of venture, the structure of the entered industry is critical to survival and success. Third, once the initial corporate strategy decision is made, the performance of any venture will largely depend upon the business-level strategy selected by the entrepreneur. Finally, in spite of its importance, a strategy is only as good as the resources it deploys and the structure, processes, and systems the venture uses to implement it. If the venture is resource-poor or structurally weak, its probability of forestalling failure is low; if it lacks the resources and organizational structure, processes, and systems needed to develop competitive advantage, its probability of successfully exploiting economic opportunity is nil.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This article provides initial guidelines for future studies of new venture performance. Variables for operationalizing the five elements of the model are provided in Tables 2-6 and the propositions presented above suggest the nature of their relationships with new venture survival and success.
Future studies should proceed in the following directions. First, confirmatory research to test the basic propositions proposed in this article is needed. Such studies should also attempt to establish the importance of the numerous individual variables representing each element of the model. Second, exploratory research is needed to develop more fully strategic management theory as it applies to new ventures. Although this study provides a skeletal theory and model of the determinants of new venture performance, the questions this extended model may answer are dwarfed by the questions it leaves unanswered. For example, how do the various variables that represent the determinants of new venture performance interact? What sorts of strategies work best with certain types of distinctive competences? At what point in time in a venture's development, and by what processes, does a distinctive competence emerge? And so on.
Third, comparative studies of independent and corporate-owned ventures could lead to a better understanding of their differences with respect to the nature of the relationships between performance and the variables represented by the five elements of the model. Such studies would permit greater cross-fertilization of research results and accelerate the accumulation of knowledge in the field. Based on what has been found to date with respect to corporate-owned ventures (e.g., Burgelman, 1983a Burgelman, , 1983b Burgelman, , 1984 , we expect that differences in resources and organization, structure, processes, and systems (Kanter, 1989; McKinney & McKinney, 1989; Sykes, 1986 ) may explain why independent ventures appear to have higher failure rates, yet when surviving, tend to outperform corporate-owned ventures (Weiss, 1981) .
Whatever research directions are taken, it is hoped that the extended model of new venture performance outlined in this article will encourage researchers to more fully consider the nature of both the sample studied and the various contingencies that might influence results. Future studies should, therefore, ensure that representative samples from identifiable populations of ventures are selected, and carefully reflect on and report the manner in which each of the five elements of the model are controlled for or allowed to vary.
